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COMMENTS
tion. Of course it is to be recognized there will always be situa-
tions where one of the parents may not be able to enjoy in fact
the visitation rights he would have if he and the custodian parent
lived in the same locality, but it would seem that the action taken
by the trial judge in the Sanford case was more consistent with
the actual interests involved in any custody problem when both
parents are living. In such instances there are actually three
interests, and not only one. There is, of. course, the welfare of
the child; but as long as this is not violated it would seem that
the custody and visitation order should be so designed as to
facilitate the maximum contact of both parents with the child.
It is submitted that it is the recognition of these three interests
that prompted the decision in the recent United States Supreme
Court case of May v. Anderson,12 under which a custody judg-
ment is not entitled to full faith and credit when opposed by a
parent who was not before the court which rendered it.'8
John M. Shaw
Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in
Louisiana Criminal Cases'
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
"Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided
in this Code." 2 No definition of hearsay evidence is given, nor is
there a setting out of the exceptions. As a consequence, one who
would understand the nature of hearsay evidence in Louisiana
criminal jurisprudence must glean his rules and definitions from
12. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
13. This paper does not go into the question of whether a custodian par-
ent who is also natural tutor under Civil Code Articles 157 and 246 may
remove his child and domicile beyond the limits of the state without seeking
permission of the court which rendered the custody judgment. This matter
was considered in the case of Wilmot v. Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321
(1953), and there it seems to have been assumed that such permission would
be required. A good discussion of that case is contained in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Tutorship and Custody, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 127 (1953).
1. Civil cases are not discussed because the exclusionary rules of
evidence as used in civil matters most often go to the weight rather than
the admissibility of the evidence.
2. LA. R.S. § 15:434 (1950).
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cases containing greatly varied factual situations and seemingly
diverse reasons for excluding hearsay evidence from trials. The
hearsay problem is an old one, common to most jurisdictions,
and it has been analyzed and discussed by eminent text writers.
It would be well to use this wealth of material in determining
the precise nature of hearsay evidence, 8 and to emphasize the
distinction between the hearsay and non-hearsay use of extra-
judicial statements, before attempting to analyze the Louisiana
cases discussing hearsay.
Professor Wigmore describes the two great classes of evi-
dence as testimonial and non-testimonial.4 A human utterance,
or assertion, is a testimonial assertion only when made on the
witness stand. A rational system, epitomized as the hearsay
rule, provides for the exclusion of human assertions offered as
though made on the witness stand, but which are in fact made
extra-judicially. Whether or not a statement thus offered can in
reality have the same effect as an assertion made on the stand,
it is at the base of the hearsay rule.
The hearsay rule as conventionally stated excludes extra-
judicial statements offered to prove the truth of the matter
contained in the statement. Although the rule might appear
contrary to the view that all relevant evidence should be admit-
ted during a trial, its justification will appear from an examina-
tion of the considerations giving rise to it.
A trial is no more than an elaborate procedure for establish-
ing facts and determining therefrom the status of the parties'
legal rights. The adversaries have an interest in knowing that the
evidence admitted to establish facts appears in its true character
and is thus accorded only such weight as it merits. The best
evidence principle, of which the hearsay rule is one highly
refined branch,5 is aimed at a similar interest, since under this
theory the trier-of-fact should consider only the best evidence
of the facts sought to be established. The protection of those
interests is of great importance when a fact is sought to be estab-
lished by a credible testimonial assertion because of the different
and sometimes higher probative effect it has in establishing a
given fact, as contrasted to non-testimonial evidence offered to
3. The author has relied heavily on the writings of Professors Wigmore
and Morgan. Where material is taken directly from their works the specific
citation is given.
4. WIGMOR, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 12 (3d ed. 1937).
5. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
497 et seq. (1898).
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establish the same fact. If we could validly use the term quantity
in speaking of evidence, we could say it takes a great deal more
evidence to establish a fact inferentially from circumstantial
evidence than to establish it by credible direct, or testimonial,
evidence. The difference exists because the trier hearing an
assertion is asked to rely upon the credibility of the asserter and
to accept the existence of the fact asserted because the asserter
vouches for it-because he says it is so and is a credible person,
it is so. The assertion would seem to be a brief style of saying that
the asserter knows the fact exists because he perceived it; he
now manifests the perception in a testimonial declaration to the
trier, who should accept the fact insofar as he favorably evaluates
the credibility factors of the asserter. When the same fact is
sought to be established with non-testimonial evidence, the trier
should believe it exists only when an allowable series of in-
ferences from the evidence, governed by man's experience with
similar circumstances, has led him to that conclusion.
A person is capable of perceiving matters within himself,
such as intentions, thoughts, or emotions, as well as external
facts. Since a person's mind is not of the nature of a photo-
graphic plate, which can be examined by the trier to determine
the exact impression, or perception, retained thereon, the person
must manifest his perception by words or actions. Whether or
not the manifestation is accurate, and whether or not the percep-
tion was a faithful recording of the fact, are important questions.
The only way to answer them is to cross-examine the perceiver,
evaluating his reliability of perception and his sincerity in stating
his perception, thus determining what probative weight to accord
his testimony that the asserted fact actually existed. If, therefore,
an assertion is made by a person not before the trier for exam-
ination, it is impossible for the trier to test the factors on which
he will base his belief that the fact exists. This is the objection-
able characteristic of hearsay evidence, inherent in the assertive
offering of an assertion made by a person not before the trier-
of-fact for examination to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
While on the basic analysis, it is well to point out that an
assertion can be made without words-non-verbally-which is
another way of manifesting one's perception. If it is once deter-
mined that a non-verbal act was intended as an assertion, then
the analysis of verbal hearsay is applicable.6
6. State v. Guidry, 213 La. 1047, 36 So.2d 32 (1948). In this case a sheriff
was allwed to testify that a proseculting witness had pointed out a given
1954]
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The major reason for setting forth the characteristics of hear-
say evidence in such detail is to avoid confusing the hearsay and
the non-hearsay uses of the same extra-judicial statement, for
those statements can be used non-assertively without violating
any of the principles militating peculiarly against hearsay evi-
dence. The statement is offered for a non-assertive use whenever
it is offered as a fact perceived by the witness testifying, just as
any other fact the witness might see or hear. The perception
offered is that of the witness, who perceived the utterance of the
words through his sense of hearing and manifests that perception
to the trier. The credibility factors of the one asserting the fact
(that the statement was made) are before the trier for exam-
ination. In short, the witness testifies of his own personal know-
ledge to the fact that the statement was made. On the other hand,
were the extra-judicial statement received assertively, the fact
asserted would be that related in the statement, perceived by a
person not before the trier. The non-assertive use tends to estab-
lish only the fact perceived by the witness; the assertive use
tends to establish the fact perceived by the absent declarant.
To determine whether a statement is offered assertively or
non-assertively, it is necessary only to ascertain whether the per-
ception to be relied upon is that of the testifying witness or of the
absent declarant. Let us assume that on the trial of Sneaky for
burglary, the state offers a witness to testify that "Joe said he saw
Sneaky enter the house." If what Joe said is being offered to
prove that Sneaky did enter the house, then the trier is being
asked to rely on Joe's perception in the same manner as though
he were presently testifying. This would be an assertive use, and
would be objectionable as hearsay. On the other hand, in a
slander action by Sneaky against Joe, if the same statement were
offered to show that Joe had made a defamatory statement about
Sneaky, then the witness should be asked to testify only that the
statement was made. The trier would be asked to rely on the
perception of the testifying witness, a clear non-assertive use.
There are only three basic situations in which an extra-
spot as the scene of an alleged rape. The Supreme Court held it was admitted
only to establish venue, and not to prove the truth of the assertion that the
rape had been committed at that place. This appears to be a case of non-
verbal hearsay, and should have been excluded. The act of the absent
witness in pointing out the location must have been intended to assert
"this is the spot." The court stated it did not pertain to the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused, nor did it prejudice him, thus forcing the state-
ment to weigh properly in its "effect" test. See also State v. Brasseaux,
163 La. 686, 112 So. 650 (1927).
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judicial statement can be used non-assertively, providing it is
otherwise admissible: where the question is whether or not the
words were spoken, as in a charge of slander;7 where the state of
mind of a listener is to be inferred from his having heard a given
utterance, as when showing that the listener must be possessed
of certain knowledge; and where the state of mind of a speaker
is to be inferred from his having made a given utterance.
7. State v. Thomas, 159 La. 1076, 1078, 106 So. 570, 571 (1925). In this case
a witness testified that the judge had instructed the sheriff and that the
sheriff had instructed the deputy to notify the parties of time fixed for trial.
The court spoke with extreme clarity in saying, "The objection was that the
testimony was hearsay. It was not hearsay ... because its purpose was not to
prove the truth of anything that the judge told the sheriff . . . but to prove
the fact that the instruction was given by the judge to the sheriff and by
him to his deputy."
State v. Kay, 176 La. 294, 300, 145 So. 544, 545 (1933). In this case a
witness was allowed to testify that he heard a woman say, "Oh Lord, Help
me!" and a man say, "Hush, and come on," which was objected to as hear-
say. The Supreme Court ruled that the witness was only testifying to an
occurrence just as he would testify to a report of a gunshot or the fall of a
body, or the flash of a pistol.
8. State v. Hamlet, 219 La. 278, 52 So.2d 852 (1951). In this case the
tenant-manager of a farm sold the cattle thereon and was charged with
theft. He argued that authority to sell was given to him by the agent-wife
of the absent owner in a letter to a prior tenant, The state objected to the
admission of the letter or its contents, and the trial court sustained the
objection, calling the letter immaterial, irrelevant, and hearsay. The Supreme
Court did not discuss the hearsay aspect, but held that the exclusion of the
letter might have had a material effect on the outcome of the case. The
exact contents of the letter are not known, but if there was language saying
"I give authority to sell," then the fact that the statement was made would
be relevant to show defendant's belief that he did have authority to sell and
that he did not act with criminal intent. Such a use would illustrate the
inference of a listener's state of mind from the fact that he heard (or read)
a given statement.
State v. Sharpe, 170 La. 69, 127 So. 368 (1930). In this case witness was
asked to give an explanation for testimony which conflicted with the story
given at a prior trial. He said he had been threatened. The court allowed
the answer, saying it was primary evidence of what brought about the
conflicting testimony. This is using the fact that the threat was made to
show its effect on the listener, who was the witness. The truth of the
matter contained in the threat was not important.
9. State v. Monfre, 122 La. 251, 253, 47 So. 543, 544 (1908). In this case the
witness Locayano was called on to testify that one Monfre had said,
"Di Maggio. the bitch is telling everything," when a negro woman began
telling a detective an apparently incriminating story. The Supreme Court
allowed the testimony to be admitted. It said that the object of it was to
bring out the part which Monfre himself then took in relation to the
woman's statements, and not to make use of those statements as substantive
evidence, and as being true. The court took an analytical approach, but
closed its discussion by citing State v. Price, 121 La. 53, 46 So. 99 (1908),
which admitted an extra-judicial statement as part of the admission of the
accused. With the approach the court took in the instant case, it seems
unnecessary to have relied on an exception to justify admission of the
testimony.
State v. Morgan, 142 La. 755, 77 So. 588 (1917). In this case the evidence
showed that deceased deputy sheriff suspected Morgan of illegally selling
whiskey. Witness was allowed to testify that a short time before deceased
was killed he had told the witness that he was going to get Morgan that
night. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the deputy was look-
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The first two uses are not controversial because they are so
clearly disassociated from the credibility of the asserter. But the
last category is the source of no little dispute among the text
writers and in the courts. It is best illustrated by the non-
assertive use of a statement to show the insanity of the declar-
ant. The relevance of the reported statement lies in its use as a
basis for the inference that since declarant so stated, so he
believed, which requires the acceptance of the general premise
that a person's words usually reflect his thoughts. The further
inference is then made that one so believing is insane. The op-
ponents of that mode of reasoning point out that to make the
initial inference requires a reliance on the sincerity of the absent
declarant, which is the essence of hearsay evidence.' The writer
submits with deference that the basis for that view is the con-
tention that an implied prefix to every utterance is the expres-
sion "I believe," so that every statement made by a person is in
the form "(I believe) I saw X."" Adhering to the contention, an
inference of belief from the fact that a statement was made
would be a use of the statement for the truth of the matter con-
tained therein. The view does not seem correct, for the factor
of sincerity need be operative only when the trier is asked to
accept the matter which the declarant asserts by manifesting
his perception thereof, and sincerity enters only for determining
whether the perception was accurately manifested. Since the
declarant did not manifest his belief, his sincerity cannot be
relied upon in establishing his belief.' 2
ing for Morgan, intending to arrest him for bootlegging, was relevant as a
circumstance pointing to Morgan's guilt. It stated the general rule that if
the fact that a certain statement was uttered, which would otherwise be
hearsay evidence, is relevant to the issue in a case, without regard to the
truth of the statement, it is not hearsay evidence. It seems that an inference
was allowed from statement to intent, from intent to probability of going
after Morgan.
10. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1138, 1143
(1935).
11. Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARv. L. REV. 146,
150 (1912).
12. It is possible that this contention is compatible with Professor
Wigmore's hearsay concept. The strength of the inference drawn from a
testimonial assertion depends upon the trier's impression of the asserter's
credibility, which is judged by the trier in the light of what has been the
credibility of asserters in like circumstances. The same reasoning must be
used to judge the credibility of an absent asserter. The only difference is
that the judging of a present asserter can be based on a greater number of
circumstances, such as physical reactions and personal appearance, which
the trier can observe for himself. It follows that the disparity in observable
credibility factors is the sole basis for treating present asserters differently
from absent asserters, a difference in degree rather than in kind. Hence,
there can be a reliance on the sincerity, or credibility, of an absent asserter,
but by definition it cannot be in a sufficient degree to raise the statement to
[VOL. XIV
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The most famous case allowing an inference of intent from
a statement of the declarant is Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon.1
The words of the absent declarant were: "I expect to go to
Crooked Creek." The court allowed the inference first that the
absent declarant had the intention of going, and second that
since he intended to go, one would be justified in believing that
he did go. The only hearsay problem concerns the inference of
intent from the fact of the statement's having been made; for
once his intent has been established, the probability of his hav-
ing gone is an inference based upon the predictability of a per-
son's carrying out his intentions.
Going a step further into the situation presented by the
above mentioned statement, one finds it is not a strained con-
struction to hold that "I expect to go" is the equivalent of, or
even synonymous with "I intend to go." If the court considered
it in that light, it seems that they allowed the statement to go
to the truth of the matter stated and therefore allowed a hearsay
use. Professor Wigmore classifies it as hearsay, since he expressly
includes such a declaration of intention within an exception to
the hearsay rule.14 Yet, if our earlier reasoning is correct, it
follows that the inference of such an intent could be made with-
out relying on the credibility of the declarant, but upon the
common knowledge that men's words usually reflect their
thoughts, a premise established in the trier's mind by experi-
ence. The distinction perhaps is unduly fine, but it rests on the
same foundation as the premise that a testimonal assertion of a
fact has a different probative effect in establishing a fact than
has the same statement used non-assertively.
An extra-judicial statement offered non-assertively is not
automatically admissible, but must qualify under the criteria
of relevancy, materiality, and risk of undue prejudice. Its rele-
vancy and materiality must balance the prejudice which might
flow from the inability of the ordinary person to calculate the
fine difference in probative value which would distinguish the
assertive and non-assertive uses of the same statement. It follows
that there should exist a great need for the evidence before a
court should admit such statements as that in the Hillmon case,i5
the level of a testimonial assertion unless it is offered as such. Since the
insanity statement is never offered as a testimonial assertion, it seems that
some degree of sincerity could be relied on, but not to the extent that it
would be objectionable as hearsay.
13. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
14. 6 WIGMORE, EvDENCE § 1715 (3d ed. 1940).
15. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
1954]
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since the inference allowed from its non-assertive use coincided
with the truth of the matter asserted. The writer does not under-
take to state the criteria for determining admissibility; the sub-
ject is mentioned only as a 'corollary to the point of major im-
portance that a non-assertive use of a statement does not suffer
ab initio the disability attaching to its assertive use.
The treatment of the hearsay rule by the Louisiana courts
does not appear as a consistent pattern. The various hearsay
problems have been encountered and dealt with, including non-
verbal hearsay16 and the non-assertive use of statements to show
the state of mind of the speaker,17 to show that the words were
spoken,'8 and to show the knowledge or state of mind of a lis-
16. State v. Venson, 142 La. 245, 247, 76 So. 701, 702 (1917). In this case
the testifying witness was allowed to state that another witness had pointed
out to him a place, not specifying that it was the scene of the crime. It
was offered on the issue of venue. The Supreme Court affirmed the admission
of the testimony with the following reasoning: "No objection was made on
the ground of relevancy, and if made would not have been well founded,
since this testimony had some relevancy, in that it went to explain how the
[testifying] witness came to be acquainted with this place .... The object in
offering it was not to show that the crime had been committed at that place,
and it had no tendency so to show."
The court placed emphasis on the fact that the testifying witness related
that the other witness had only pointed out a place and had not pointed it
out as the scene of the crime. It seems that this would be a non-verbal
assertion, but from the analytical view, it was offered strictly to show that
the testifying witness was acquainted with a given spot, so it was not an
assertive use of the act. But cf. State v. Guidry, 213 La. 1047, 36 So.2d 32
(1948), discussed note 6 supra, where the statement was used assertively.
State v. Winstead, 204 La. 366, 15 So.2d 793 (1943). In this case a father
testified to his, observation of his son's preparations to leave home for the
armed forces. The court held it not to be hearsay because the witness had
direct knowledge of the preparations. This seems to be a case of the court's
inferring intent from non-verbal conduct, which is clearly not hearsay in
the absence of a showing that it was intended as an assertion.
17. State v. Dunn, 161 La. 532, 109 So. 56 (1926). In this trial for the
death of a peace officer, the witness was asked to repeat what the deceased
had said regarding where he was going and what he was going to do. The
purpose was to establish that deceased was going to the home of defendants
to serve a warrant on them, which would connect defendants with deceased
at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court ruled it admissible to show
the intention and the purpose of the deceased. It relied on State v. Morgan,
142 La. 755, 77 So. 588 (1917), discussed note 9 supra, which had also held
statements of deceased admissible to show where he was going. The court
may have considered this an exception to the hearsay rule since it indicated
that the statements were ex parte declarations of a deceased as to his
purpose and were admissible as original evidence. See also State v. Anthony,
166 La. 793, 117 So. 921 (1928); State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923).
The fact that it was the statement of a deceased appears to have been
given great weight. Although the court said this was not hearsay, it was
important only for the truth of the matter stated-that the deceased was
going to the home of the defendants. It therefore seems that the court
reached the same result as that in the Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145
U.S. 285 (1892), by allowing it to show intent as the initial inference. Had
the statement more directly concerned the guilt of the accused, a different
result might have been reached.
18. See note 7 supra.
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tener.19 Such terms as original and natural evidence, and ex
parte declarations have been used in the analysis and disposition
of hearsay questions.2 0 The use of the term independent rele-
vance,2 1 and the reasoning it illustrates, is more significant than
any other, because its definition contemplates what Professor
Wigmore would call the non-assertive use of a statement, which
should indicate in this particular instance that the Louisiana
courts are applying something like our earlier analysis. But
independent relevance goes further, for it requires that the
non-assertive use have an evidential value, thus combining in a
single term the two steps logically necessary for the analytical
approach engendered by reliance on the hearsay rule advocated
by Professor Wigmore. The analytical approach consists of first
deciding whether or not the statement is offered assertively,
and, if it is not, then deciding whether the fact that it was made
has sufficient relevancy to warrant its admission. The same rea-
soning must be exercised under either approach, but the former
emphasizes the non-assertive use, while the latter turns first to
the assertive use. The Louisiana court has stated a more elab-
orate rule based on independent relevance,22 but the elements
are the same. An understanding of this is important only to
show that the basic analysis of hearsay is generally the same in
19. State v. Morgan, 211 La. 572, 30 So.2d 434 (1947). In this case the
defendant had shot his mother-in-law at her home. State bffered evidence
that defendant had brought the shotgun with him to kill his wife, which he
had earlier threatened to do. Defendant attempted to contradict this
evidence by showing that several years earlier his mother-in-law had warned
him of his father-in-law's violence and the shotgun had been brought along
only for self-protection. The Supreme Court held that evidence of the warn-
ings of the mother-in-law should have been admitted for the purpose of
contradicting the evidence which the state had introduced to prove the
purpose for which the defendant had taken his shotgun with him. It was not
offered to prove the truth of what the mother-in-law had told him.
State v. Coll, 146 La. 597, 83 So. 844 (1919). In this case the question to
the witness was whether or not he had received reports from the deceased
employee concerning irregularities on the part of defendant, who was
charged with killing the deceased. The court said the answer was not
hearsay, because it was an independent fact which the witness had observed;
it was not irrelevant since it was what led to the killing; it would have been
hearsay had it been offered to prove the irregularities reported, but here it
was offered to prove intent by showing the fact that the report had been
made.
20. State v. Anthony, 166 La. 793, 117 So. 921 (1928).
21. See State v. Garon, 158 La. 1014, 105 So. 47 (1925), discussed note
25 infra.
22. State v. Cole, 145 La. 900, 902, 83 So. 184, 185 (1919). In this case
Chief Justice O'Niell stated: "Of course, the rule excluding hearsay evidence
does not apply when the mere fact that the statement was made (by the
person not under oath) is itself a relevant and important fact. But, if the
fact that the statement was made (by the person not under oath) would be
of no importance except for the truth of the statement, it is not admissible."
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Louisiana as that set out by the text writers, though the terms
used by the court may be different.
With this background in mind, one can discern the pattern
of treatment of the hearsay rule as one which varies in emphasis
according to the facts of the particular case. This is altogether
proper. If a statement is offered for a non-assertive use, but con-
tains an assertion of a matter which is prejudicial to the accused,
then the emphasis is naturally on weighing relevancy against
risk of undue prejudice. 23 When the court determines that the
statement does not have sufficient relevancy to outweigh the
risk of undue prejudice, it often says that the statement is ex-
cluded as hearsay.24 Though the language used appears to offend
the analytical approach, the result is very sound. The assertive
or non-assertive character of the extra-judicial statement is
being judged by its probable effect on the trier, and not solely by
the mode of offering. If the content of the statement be such
that the truth of the matter stated is more likely to take effect
upon the trier's mind than is the fact that it was made, with a
resulting high risk of undue prejudice, then, regardless of how
offered, it is treated as being used for the truth of the statement
and objectionable as hearsay.25
23. State v. Lowery, 214 La. 465, 38 So.2d 77 (1948). In this trial for the
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, state witness was allowed to testify over
defendant's objection that he had received complaints of defendant's selling
intoxicating liquor, although he himself did not know of the sales. It seems
that the testimony was offered to show the fact of complaint and not the
fact of whiskey sales. The Supreme Court remanded the case for prejudicial
error, which is consistent with the rule that when the truth of the statement
is more relevant to a material issue than is the fact that it was made, with
a resulting high risk of undue prejudice, the statement will be excluded as
hearsay evidence.
See also State v. Elkins, 214 La. 501, 38 So.2d 150 (1948); State v. Kimble,
214 La. 58, 36 So.2d 637 (1948).
State v. Cole, 145 La. 900, 83 So. 184 (1919). In this case the witness for
the state was allowed to relate to the jury all the details of the assault
with intent to rape committed upon prosecutrix, as related to the witness
by the prosecutrix. The Supreme Court disallowed it, saying that when the
fact that the statement was made by a person (not under oath) would be
of no importance except for the truth of the statement, it is not admissible.
24. Ibid.
25. State v. Brown, 161 La. 704, 706, 109 So. 394, 395 (1926). In this case
a detective testified that a woman in the room had told him it was defend-
ant's room. In deciding that the statement was hearsay evidence, the
Supreme Court stated a relevance test as follows: "If the fact that the
woman made the statement to the detective while he was searching the
room had been, of itself and without regard for the truth of the statement,
a material or important fact, the fact that she made the statement would
have been admissible. But the woman's statement was not at all important
or relevant to the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant, except
in so far as the jury might have believed the statement to be true. It was
therefore subject to the rule forbidding hearsay evidence."
State v. Garon, 158 La. 1014, 105 So. 47 (1925). In this case the state's
1954] COMMENTS
On the other hand, when there is little danger that the as-
sertive content of the statement will be prejudicial, so that it
takes only a slight degree of relevance to balance the risk of
undue prejudice, the Louisiana court emphasizes that the pro-
ponent seeks to prove only the fact that the statement was
made.28 Similarly, where there is a high risk of undue prejudice,
but the circumstances of the case lend great relevance to the
fact that the statement was made, the courts have also empha-
sized that the statement is offered for a non-assertive use.2 These
witness Miller testified that he had identified Chutz, one of the defendants.
Apparently for corroborative purposes, the sheriff then testified that Miller
had identified Chutz, but that Chutz had not been present at the time.
Defense objected that Miller's identification in the presence of the sheriff
was hearsay. The trial judge admitted it as the direct testimony of the
sheriff to the fact that Miller had identified the accused. The Supreme
Court called it hearsay since the mere existence of the fact of identification
was not relevant, and its probable effect was to support Miller's testimony,
thus being used more for the truth of the matter stated-that Miller had
identified the accused-than for the fact that it was made.
State v. Butler, 114 La. 596, 597, 38 So. 466 (1905). In murder trial based
on circumstantial evidence, state witness was asked "if he was in church on
the night of the murder, and, if so, to state who else was there, and if he saw
Archie Butler [defendant]." Witness replied, "Joe Carr and myself was
standing in front of the church house, and we seen some one pass there, and
it looked to be Archie Butler, and I asked him who it was, and he says,
'That's Archie,' and we called Archie by name." Defendant objected to it as
hearsay. Trial court admitted the testimony apparently as being relevant.
The Supreme Court ruled the admission of the testimony to be reversible
error. It counted heavily the fact that the presence of defendant at the
church was an important point and said that such testimony allowed not
the knowledge of the testifying witness, but that of Joe Carr, the absent
declarant, to reach the jury. The prosecution seems to have offered the
statement in proof of defendant's presence at the church.
26. State v. Natalle, 172 La. 709, 135 So. 34 (1931). In this case defendant
charged with receiving stolen goods argued that the goods were not stolen
because the owner consented to the taking. The owner had assisted police
in setting trap to catch thieves, after an informer told police of the plan. In
attempting to establish that the owner had never consented to the taking,
sheriff was asked whether the proposition to steal had been made to him or
someone else. The Supreme Court relied on the trial judge's per curiam,
which stated that the testimony was the only way to establish the fact of
the agreement as to the entrapment. Apparently the reasoning was that if
the proposition had been made to the owner by one who participated in the
taking, there would have been a consent to the taking. By showing that
the proposition was made to the sheriff it became apparent that the owner
could not have consented. The exact proposition made to the sheriff does
not appear in the opinion, but it seemed to have been offered solely for the
fact that it was made. The per curiam negated the possibility of prejudice
to the accused by pointing out that he also was seeking to get that testimony.
State v. Jackson, 223 La. 435, 65 So.2d 903 (1953). In this case a tag on a
corpse bore the name "Frances Foster." The witness, a doctor, was asked
whether the body bore the tag at the time of autopsy. It was objected to as
hearsay. The court allowed the doctor to answer, saying that the purpose of
the question was not to prove that the body was that of Frances Foster,
but merely that the tag was on the body when it was examined.
27. See note 17 supra.
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cases closely resemble the text writers' analytical approach.2
The result of using these two points of emphasis has been
to create the impression that two separate tests have been used.
They are in fact different branches of a single balancing process
based on the probable effect of the extra-judicial statement upon
the trier. Looking to the effect of the statement to distinguish
hearsay from non-hearsay still requires a firm grasp of the dis-
tinction between the assertive and non-assertive uses of extra-
judicial statements, and should produce just results on any given
trial if the judge is aware of all factors entering into the proper
use of the test. The rule best serves as one for determining
whether a statement's effect would come chiefly from the truth
of the matter contained therein, or from the mere fact that it
was made. It is very useful when applied to statements admis-
sible for either an assertive or non-assertive use; but it is mis-
leading to label non-assertive evidence as hearsay becasue it is
irrelevant and immaterial.29 Valid evidence may thereby be
excluded by one not exercising the delicate judgment necessary
to make the "effect" test a proper one, because the full reason-
ing is not easily seen when a statement is offered non-assertively,
28. There are also cases which do not mention the relevance test,
such as:
State v. Shelby, 215 La. 637, 639, 41 So.2d 458, 459 (1949). In this trial on
a charge of simple burglary, a state witness was asked if he had been
informed in his official capacity as marshal that stolen items were recovered,
to which witness answered, "yes, sir." The Supreme Court allowed the state-
ment, saying that it brought out only the fact that he had been advised of
the recovery, which would not be hearsay. Had the statement made to the
marshal been offered to prove the recovery of the tires, it would have been
a hearsay use of the statement. As it was, It seems to have been a clear
non-assertive use.
State v. Sutcliffe, 159 La. 305, 307, 105 So. 352, 353 (1925). In this case
a prosecuting witness was asked by the state: "Who were the agents of
defendant that came to you?" A second question was asked: "Did anybody
offer you $100?" Defendant objected because the answers would be hearsay.
The Supreme Court held that the "state did not attempt to prove what the
four parties named stated to the prosecuting witness, but the mere fact that
the parties had made an offer of compromise, and that in so doing they were
acting at the instance of the defendant." The court drew this distinction
without making any reference to relevance or risk of prejudice.
29. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945). In this case defense
counsel asked prosecuting witness if he had been told at an earlier time
that his co-defendant had been arrested on other charges. The Supreme
Court held that the answer would be hearsay, irrelevant, and immaterial
because it would consist of unsworn statements made to the witness by
certain third parties. Whether or not this was hearsay evidence depends on
the purpose for which the question was asked, and the purpose does not
appear in the opinion. If the defense were trying to show the witness' belief
that such charges were made, which might discredit his other testimony,
the fact that he was told of the arrest would be important completely apart
from whether or not his co-defendant had actually been arrested. Since the
desired answer did not apparently concern the material issues, it is difficult
to see that it was objectionable as being prejudicial.
COMMENTS
yet excluded as hearsay. What would objectively be an assertive
use in one situation might be treated as a non-assertive use else-
where, since a change in the factual situation would vary the
effect of the offered statement. It is therefore .possible that in
cases decided with the "effect" test, the mode of offering, and
not the "effect," will be seized as the basis of the decision.80
The most feasible plan for avoiding this possible confusion
and for affording clarity to the Louisiana courts' treatment of
the hearsay rule is to have legislation enacted which spells out
a definition of hearsay evidence and lists specific exceptions to
the exclusionary rule.
Two rules in the Uniform Rules of Evidence31 set out a
hearsay rule with attendant exceptions. Rule 63 provides that
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a wit-
ness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth
of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible .. -"32
Thirty-one subsections set out in detail the exceptions to the
rule. According to the comment following the above quoted sec-
tion, the rule "follows Wigmore in defining hearsay as an extra-
judicial statement which is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated."38 The writer submits that it apparently differs
with Wigmore's view that when an extra-judicial statement is
offered assertively the original declarant is considered to be the
asserter;8 4 the following was quoted by Professor Wigmore in
.explanation of his view: "The individual testifying is merely
the conduit or pipe through whose agency the impressions of
someone else are conveyed to the Court. The real proof is the
hearsay statement." 5 The use of the word evidence at the begin-
ing of Rule 63 makes it appear that the offered assertion is that
of the testifying witness who reports the hearsay statement.
This may not be the intended meaning, but the definition of
evidence found in the Uniform Rules of Evidence lends strength
30. State v. Harris, 166 La. 759, 117 So. 820 (1928). In this case the
Supreme Court affirmed exclusion of questions whose answers called for
statements giving the opinion of the police. Their reasons were that it was
objectionable as being hearsay, as calling for an opinion of the police, as
being of no probative value, and therefore irrelevant, and because it was
not part of the res gestae. The purpose for which the question was offered
was not discussed.
31. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rules 62, 63 (1953).
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id. at Rule 63, comment.
34. 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940).
35. APPLETON, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 174 (1860), as quoted in 5 WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1316 (3d ed. 1940).
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to this interpretation, since evidence is defined as "the means
from which inferences may be drawn .... 3"6 If it is the asser-
tion of the testifying witness which is being offered, then it
seems that the reported statement would not be offered asser-
tively; but the assertive offering is essential to the theory that
the hearsay rule is violated only when the credibility of the
absent asserter is relied on in establishing the fact. It is submitted
that a simpler and more accurate rule, and one more in accord
with Professor Wigmore's theory, would be: "An assertion made
by a person not testifying at the hearing and offered as an asser-
tion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is hearsay evi-
dence and inadmissible, except. . ....
To clarify the Louisiana courts' criteria of admissibility for
the non-assertive use of extra-judicial statements it would be
well to set out, either as an explanatory comment following the
above suggested rule or as a separate rule, the test apparently
used by our Louisiana Supreme Court-if the content of the
statement be such that the truth of the matter stated is more
likely to take effect upon the trier's mind than is the fact that
it was made, with a resulting high risk of undue prejudice, then
the statement is inadmissible.
The compiling of a list of desirable exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule is beyond the scope of this comment. The exceptions
listed as the subsections of Rule 63, Uniform Rules of Evidence,
nearly exhaust the possible exceptions. A thorough investiga-
tion of them would determine which would be adaptable to our
Louisiana policy.3
William E. Crawford
Thomas N. Frisby
36. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 1 (1953).
37. The following exceptions are examples of those set forth in the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63:
"(5) Dying Declarations. A statement by a person unavailable as a
witness because of his death if the judge finds that it was made voluntarily
and in good faith and while the declarant was conscious of his impending
death and believed that there was no hope of recovery;"
"(12) Statements of Physical or Mental Condition of Declarant. Unless
the judge finds it was made in bad faith, a statement of the declarant's (a)
then existing state of mind, emotion or physical sensation, including state-
ments of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health,
but not including memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed, when such a mental or physical condition is in issue or is relevant
to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant, or (b) previous
symptoms, pain or physical sensation, made to a physician consulted for
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